NATO

The Harmel Report Anniversary

Dr. Tracey German

2017 marks fifty years since the publication of NATO’s seminal Harmel Report, which reasserted the basic principles of the alliance and introduced the concept of cooperative security based on deterrence and dialogue. The Report committed the alliance to a twin-track policy, advocating the need to seek a relaxation of tensions between East and West, whilst maintaining adequate defence. Fifty years later, these issues are back at the top of the security agenda as relations between Russia and the West reach a new low. The post-Cold War evolution of NATO, which has seen it expand its membership and shift focus away from a purely defensive role towards out-of-area operations, is coming under pressure, as the alliance once again seeks to remain relevant and united. Russia is both a security problem for NATO and part of the solution, demonstrated most recently by the twin challenges of Ukraine and Syria.

Among the key themes of the 1967 report was the USSR’s place in the European security order and NATO’s quest to define a political role for itself, rather than a purely military one focused on collective defence: a state of affairs that resonates today. While there are similarities between the challenges facing the alliance in 1967 and the contemporary strategic environment, not least the disparity between the power of the United States and that of the European pillar, as well as the ongoing debate about Russia’s role in the European security order, the report’s key concern was the perceived continuing expansion of Soviet influence around the world, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. This stands in stark contrast to the situation today. Now it is Russia that has expressed its grave concerns about the perceived continuing expansion of NATO’s influence (and that of the West more generally) around the world, and more particularly within its ‘zone of privileged interest’. In the context of the Soviet challenge, the Harmel Report stated that the security of member states rested upon two pillars: the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of the NATO countries if aggression should occur, as well as realistic measures to reduce tensions and the risk of conflict. While the tables have been turned in the twenty-first century, Harmel’s twin pillars of deterrence and dialogue remain central to Euro-Atlantic security, particularly for the alliance’s newer members. This was underlined by the focus of the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw on the continuing threat to Euro-Atlantic security from Russia, leading to an emphasis on deterrence and a strengthening of the alliance’s defence posture. However, against a backdrop of continuing tensions between NATO and Russia, and futile attempts at dialogue, the deterrence pillar appears to be by far the more resilient of the two.

The political (dialogue), rather than military (deterrence), aspect of the alliance has always been the more controversial, particularly when connected to the question of enlargement, which has exposed tensions within the alliance with regard to these twin pillars of the Harmel report. The post-Cold War policy of enlargement has brought the alliance into competition, and in some cases direct confrontation, with Moscow, the very opposite effect to that intended: NATO’s own 1995 study on the topic maintained that enlargement was only one ‘element of a broad European security architecture that transcends and renders obsolete the idea of “dividing lines” in Europe’.

Since its establishment in 1949, the alliance has more than doubled its membership from 12 to 28 states, and the majority of the new entrants have joined since the end of the Cold War. The accession of Montenegro, expected to be completed in 2017, will take the total membership to 29. These enlargements have, to some extent, undermined NATO’s stated objectives in incorporating new members, and have exposed tensions within the alliance over deterrence and dialogue, the twin pillars of the 1967 Harmel Report on ‘the future security policy of the alliance’. These outcomes are the direct result of the enlargements of the post-Cold War era being motivated by political, rather than—as the enlargements of 1952 and 1955 had been—military considerations. In a recent article in International Affairs, I argue that in the light of the fundamental tension between its current ‘open door’ policy and Moscow’s desire to preserve its ‘zone of privileged interest’, NATO needs to revisit the purpose of enlargement and the balance between the two core pillars of the Harmel Report. Only then can it address fundamental questions of why (and if) it should continue to enlarge. Enlargement has become a symbolic act rather than one of defensive necessity, as the recent incorporation of members from the Balkans demonstrates. Montenegro’s accession is a vital demonstration of the alliance’s continuing commitment to its promises regarding its ‘open door’ policy, indicating the primacy of the political, rather than military, aspects of enlargement. However, Montenegro is likely to be the last new member state for some time to come, alliance consensus regarding further expansion proving elusive in the face of a combination of ‘enlargement fatigue’ among western allies (many of which are focused on internal challenges), concern about the apparent threat from Moscow and a lack of non-contentious candidate states.

Image: Pierre Harmel. Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

The Age of Uncertainty: US Foreign Policy in the Trump Era?

By Dr. Ellen Hallams and Dr. Tracey German

In April 2016, Donald Trump declared ‘We must as a nation be more unpredictable.’ In a speech on foreign policy during the Republican primary campaign, Trump – who at that point was the front-runner for the GOP nomination – set out what the New York Times in its editorial described as a ‘strange worldview,’ one that appears to be a throwback to the isolationist movement of the 1930s – ‘America First’ – but which betrays a total misunderstanding of the complexities of the world in which America is deeply embedded. Dissecting that worldview and extrapolating what the Trump administration’s foreign policy will look like over the coming months and years is something of a fool’s errand; this is a man who prides himself on being unpredictable, in keeping allies and enemies second-guessing his intentions, and using his personal Twitter feed to make policy pronouncements.

Yet amidst the chaos, some things are all too clear. The first is that the world as we know it has been upended, and is now violently spinning on its axis. Most of us in the West have grown up in a world defined by certain core principles – democracy, liberty, the rule of law, human rights, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want and fear – embedded in a liberal order that the US – more than any other nation – has sought to defend, maintain and advance since 1945. It is in part because we live in such a world that Donald Trump now finds himself sitting in the White House, democratically elected (though not by a majority of the American people) with the freedom to express the views he holds. But by doing so, he is undermining many of the values on which liberal order rests: refugees who find themselves being turned away from American airports are living in fear, their yearning to breathe free suffocated by the stroke of a pen; the LGBT community in the US feels more afraid than at any point since the end of the Cold War, while women in America face the prospect that their right to an abortion will be stripped away; Muslims in America are increasingly vilified and demonised, no longer free to worship in peace. Protestors are dismissed and derided; in the world of @readldonaldtrump these are not the legitimate acts of a people with the constitutional right to ‘peaceably assemble,’ but the product of manufactured outrage created by a liberal elite hell-bent on undermining the will of the people.

Internationally, Trump represents the greatest deviation from the liberal bipartisan consensus that has underpinned US foreign policy since 1990. In Obama’s parting speech to the UN he spoke passionately about the threats facing liberal international order. That liberal order has rested not only on a set of core ideas and values, but also an institutional architecture centred on the UN and NATO. Yet in his policy pronouncements thus far, Trump appears to be re-writing the script. He has injected a greater degree of instability into America’s relations with Europe and NATO than any presidency since the end of the Cold War, and is far more willing to embrace, rather than reject, the alternative vision of international order promulgated by Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Trump’s election has injected a new element of uncertainty into an already perilous state of affairs in Eastern Europe; not only are Putin’s intentions unclear, so are Trump’s. Lawrence Freedman once wrote that credibility is the ‘magic ingredient’ of deterrence. It is one thing for NATO to be facing uncertainty over Putin’s intentions, it is quite another to be facing its own crisis of credibility caused by uncertainty over the Trump administration’s policy towards both Russia and NATO; this at a time when Europe is witnessing the biggest deployment of US military forces to the continent since the Cold War.

Relations with Moscow may well prove to be one of the most pivotal elements of Trump’s foreign policy; between them, Trump and Putin have the ability to shape international order in ways that affect us all. A matter of weeks after the election of Trump, Putin signed a new Foreign Policy Concept, outlining Russia’s ambitions to play a leading role on the international stage and boost cooperation with the administration of the new US president. It remains to be seen whether these two goals are mutually exclusive – whilst the early atmospherics surrounding both the Russian and US camp have been positive, there are still many obstacles ahead. Moscow has consistently opposed what it views as a US dominance of the international system and has made frequent reference to the destabilising influence of Washington, DC’s international actions.

Trump’s election success was greeted with elation in Russia, with Trump ‘fever’ leading to some interesting images being published in the Russian media: boxes of sugar bearing Trump’s smiling face, the Army of Russia store offering a 10% discount for US citizens and embassy employees on the day of Trump’s inauguration and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of Russian far-right party, the LDPR, drinking champagne with members of his party in celebration of Trump’s election victory. But these images contrast sharply with the realities of the state of the current relationship between Washington, DC and Moscow, which had hit rock-bottom during Obama’s presidency. Whilst it remains unclear what the direction of the Trump administration’s foreign policy will be, there are already signs that it will take a hard line, particularly with regards to international terrorism and the threat from IS – Trump has indicated that torture is an acceptable tool in the fight against IS, a hard-line stance that will appeal to the Kremlin, which has never shied away from the use of force (legitimate or not) in pursuit of its strategic objectives. This highlights one of the key potential drivers of any future US-Russia relationship: similar personality traits. Both presidents like to portray themselves as ‘strong men’ who are seeking to make their countries ‘great’ again. Relations between the two are currently in a honeymoon phase, with each president apparently delighted to have found a similar character in the other, but there could be problems ahead if neither is willing to embrace compromise or concession.

Following UK PM Theresa May’s visit to Washington, DC on January 27, Trump and Putin held an hour-long telephone conversation during which both leaders apparently undertook to repair bilateral relations. During a wide-ranging conversation, they discussed the fight against terrorism and ongoing instability across the Middle East, as well as the possibility of expanding their economic ties. This latter issue raises the possibility of US sanctions against Russia being lifted, although the topic was not discussed during their call. Trump has mooted the possibility of lifting the sanctions regime, imposed in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and ongoing support for pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. This position is at odds with that of Europe: European leaders including May, Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande, have all expressed their opposition to any lifting of sanctions until Moscow complies fully with the terms of the Minsk agreement. Any attempt by the Trump administration to ease the sanctions regime risks the emergence of further rifts between the US and Europe, which is precisely what the Kremlin is seeking.

The new Foreign Policy Concept suggests that Russia will continue its pivot towards Asia, partly driven by the lack of access to Western markets, a consequence of the ongoing sanctions regime. However, it also makes clear that Russia will continue to consolidate its position as a ‘centre of influence in today’s world’. Encouraged by its use of the military lever in Syria, Russia is likely to take an even more assertive line on the global stage over the coming year and will seek to boost its international influence by both hard and soft means.

Since Putin came to power in 2000, the Kremlin has demonstrated an increased willingness, and ability, to use the military lever to achieve broader strategic and foreign policy goals. Despite this, many in the West continue to be surprised by the primacy of hard power in Russian policy-making, particularly the use of force. Russian involvement in Syria has undoubtedly demonstrated that it is now able to project power beyond its own strategic ‘backyard’ and that it is determined to play a global role. The Kremlin appears to have high hopes for a considerable improvement both in its relations with the US and its position on the global stage. However, whilst relations between Trump and Putin are currently very positive, this could change dramatically if either oversteps and finds themselves in an opposing position.

However, as the relationship unfolds between Trump and Putin, one thing appears clear: we are living in an era of instability and uncertainty, the likes of which many of us have never experienced before.

Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

Trump and the future of NATO

Professor Andrew Dorman

Donald Trump’s election as the 45th President of the United States has been shrouded in controversy. His apparent close links with Russia and questioning about the ongoing relevance of NATO has caused concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Trump’s questioning of the European dependence on the US for its security and the imbalance in relative spending and military capability between the United States and the European members is not new for an incoming or even serving US President. Nor is a questioning of NATO’s future, John Mearsheimer’s classic ‘Back to the Future’ piece in the journal International Security are evidence of this. What is new is his questioning of Article V of the Washington Treaty which provides the collective security guarantee for all NATO members. Without it the value of NATO membership is unclear.

Adding to the complication of Trump’s challenge is the timing of this. Questioning the relevance and future of NATO at a time where Russia, and in the past its predecessor the Soviet Union, is openly becoming increasingly assertive in what it perceives to be its area of influence. The central question confronting the NATO alliance is whether to acquiesce to Russia’s tacit demands that NATO respects its dominance of the post-Soviet space and let’s Russia illegally annex the Ukraine, attack Georgia and so forth, or alternatively continues to allow democratic states that wish to continue to join the alliance and benefit from the collective security guarantee.

In response to Trump’s latest comments on NATO, German Chancellor Merkel has stated that the Europeans may have to provide for their own security without the United States. Fine words but the reality of this for Europe is at best questionable, especially given the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union and the possibility of the election of Marine Le Pen as French President followed by a French vote to leave the European Union. Countering the increasing threat posed by Russia looks increasingly precarious for those in NATO, for those in the former Soviet space that have not yet managed to join the NATO, the situation is far more disconcerting.

Fifty years on from the adoption of the Harmel report by NATO, which led to a focus on both dialogue in the form of détente and deterrence with Russia, there is increasing unease in the hallways of the NATO governments. Normally one would expect the incoming US president and those around him to emphasise reassurance and continuity to its partners. However, such conventions do not appear to apply to Donald Trump and whilst those he has nominated to key cabinet positions, such as Marine General Mattis as the new Defense Secretary, are emphasising the ongoing importance of NATO for the US, Trump himself continues to send a contradictory message which Russia would no doubt approve. At best the road ahead for NATO will be rocky, at worst we may be seeing the destruction of the most significant military alliance in history.

Image: NATO Headquarters meeting. Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

NATO’s deterrence moves in the Baltic States: falling into Russia’s trap?

Dr Rod Thornton

NATO has decided to increase the number of troops it has operating (technically, either training or exercising) in the Baltic States. Included  in this contingent will be no less than four British tanks. The stated reason for this deployment is to ‘deter’ Russian aggression against Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. All well and good on first inspection, but scratch the surface and such actions might appear outmoded, more reminiscent of the 19th century than appropriate to the conditions of the 21st.

What are these new forces intended to deter? The answer, seemingly, is a full-scale Russian invasion of a Baltic country. Yet it is far from clear whether this danger is a realistic one. Is it likely that the Kremlin will send tanks rumbling over its neighbours’ borders any time soon? Putin and his generals are perhaps not that maladroit. They will have done the maths. Where such an action is concerned, the cost-benefit balance is very much in favour of the former. Major war is not part of Russian plans – but they do want to create the impression that it might be. Hence, we now have the likes of Moscow’s sabre-rattling; its high-profile preparations for nuclear war, and its bellicose actions in Syria. Such Russian aggression has two goals: 1) to make Russia – aka Putin – look more powerful, and 2) to create divisions in opponents over how best to deal with this aggression and to thereby weaken these opponents.

The Baltic States are on the front-line of all this. For several years now, they have been the target of a substantial Russian (thus far non-violent) hybrid warfare campaign. All manner of means are being used – from information warfare (including cyber warfare); through the funding of pro-Kremlin academics and right-wing groups, and all the way up to using agent provocateurs who organise protest movements and strikes. The overall aim is to raise tensions and to thereby create the divisions that destabilise these targeted states: governing structures are weakened; faith in authority is undermined, and individuals made to turn against each other. A state becomes divided against itself. An ‘inner decay’ is created. And the greater the degree of decay then the more easily – so the theory runs in the case of the Baltic States – it is that Russia can leverage events in these states to its own advantage. Indeed, the ultimate goal of this Russian hybrid warfare is undoubtedly to foster the election of national governments who would look more favourably on Moscow and, by extension, less favourably on NATO and the West.

In essence, the Russians would see a truly successful hybrid warfare campaign as being one that does not involve the use of any external military force. But in the case of the Baltic States it is of enormous benefit for Moscow that its troops are regularly exercising just beyond their borders; that new missiles are being placed in the Kaliningrad exclave, and that Russian ships and aircraft regularly test regional defences. Merely the latent character of such force can create a profound psychological pressure that helps raise the level of tension and thus of instability within these three states.

Moscow, moreover – and here is a crucial element – has another and more convenient way of increasing the level of tension in the Baltic States: namely through the use of Russian minorities within those countries. Ethnic Russians or Russian-speakers constitute over a quarter of both Latvia’s and Estonia’s total populations. Riga and Tallinn, cities where the populations are almost 50 per cent Russian, have voted in mayors with links to Putin’s own political party. Thus, there is plenty of support for Putin and for Russia within the capital cities of these two NATO member-states. It is also worth noting that Russian minorities are mostly denied the chance to vote in national elections, but can do so in municipal ones.

These minorities are referred to as ‘compatriot Russians’ by Moscow and they are worked on assiduously as part of the hybrid warfare campaign. Of course, many of these ‘compatriots’ are quite content with their lot and are not minded to agitate in any way. A substantial number are, however, not content and it is not unimaginable that having been subject to the intense propaganda of a Moscow-directed information warfare campaign for a number of years they will eventually turn against their Baltic hosts. Moscow would probably like nothing more than to see these ethnic Russians protesting on the streets and then being subject to attacks by right-wing groups or to a violent clampdown by local security forces. This is how Russian troops will, if they ever do, re-enter the Baltic states – not in an outright invasion, but rather in a ‘humanitarian’ operation to ‘protect’ fellow Russians. The scenario often raised here relates to a possible reaction to trouble in the Estonian city of Narva. The city is 90 per cent Russian and lies just over the border from Russia itself. Would Russian troops stand idly by if ‘compatriot Russians’ were being killed in disturbances within sight of the border?

If the raising of tension in order to drive divisiveness and instability is a prime factor in any hybrid warfare campaign then the best way that the Russians can do this is through the inculcation of fear. Fear will, in particular, create the overreactions that destabilisation programmes thrive on. The fear of war is obviously a crucial variable in this respect. Moscow’s media messaging to both native Balts and to the Russian minorities plays on this fear. Included in this messaging – this signalling – are reports of everything from Moscow schoolchildren conducting their nuclear-protection drills to the bombing of Aleppo. In particular, this bombing, ostensibly designed to kill ‘terrorists’ in situ, also acts as a means to advertise to others who might oppose Russian interests just how ready Russia is to use lethal force. The Balts naturally do not want their own countries to become subject to the same use of force – to become the battlegrounds they have so often been in past wars. It could be argued that they would do anything to avoid this – including developing friendly relations with Russia. Thus, the more that Russia can stoke up a fear of war in the Baltic States the more likely it is – in theory – that Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians will, in national elections and to lessen the likelihood of that war, bring to power governments that are more amenable to Moscow.

Here is the main threat to the Baltic States from Russia. It is in the creation, though non-violent modes of hybrid warfare, of internal processes that lead to outcomes that suit Moscow’s interests. This Russian threat is an internal one, far more than it is an external one; i.e. from a military invasion. Russia does not need to invade to achieve its strategic objectives.

Indeed, Russia has played a very steady hand so far in its hybrid warfare campaign against the Baltics – there has been, for instance, no creation of terrorist incidents (a ‘late stage’ aspect of any hybrid warfare campaign), which clearly the likes of the FSB, SVR or GRU could organise if they were so inclined.

Thus, it could be argued that what matters most in terms of thwarting the Russian threat to the Baltics is to keep tensions down. This is why sending extra NATO troops to the region at this time may be seen as problematic. It is an easy sell now for the Kremlin’s propaganda machine to generate angst among the Balts by providing pictures of long columns of NATO vehicles with the strapline of, ‘here is NATO – all ready to fight a war in your country!’ And to the Russian minorities it is even easier – ‘here are NATO forces – arrived with their tanks to deal with you – the Russians!’

Moreover, there are now four MBTs in the Baltics. These are the only tanks of any description in these three states – and they are all British! So, who is then going to be made out to be the ‘aggressor’ by Moscow in the Baltic States?

Yes, of course, a deterrence posture has always to be maintained by NATO vis-à-vis Russian activities in regard to the Baltic States. But it could be argued that the few NATO ‘composite battalions’ who are already there are sufficient in deterrence terms – low-profile but sending the right signal to Moscow. That is, they were a tripwire – attack the Baltics and you attack NATO itself. Fine. So just what extra deterrent value comes from having a few more troops but who are still so small in number that they still represent nothing more than the same tripwire? Where is the logic given the propaganda coup it is for Moscow?

In essence, NATO has to do its own cost-benefit calculation – to what degree do deterrence measures become part of the problem and not part of the solution? In its new deployment of forces to the region, has NATO merely done exactly what Moscow wants it to do in terms of raising tensions – and thereby fallen into a trap? NATO needs some 21st century thinking.

Image: Russian President Putin Listens as Secretary Kerry Speaks During Their Bilateral Meeting Focused on Syria and Ukraine in Moscow. Courtesy of US DOS Flikr.

Trafalgar Day, History Rhymes, and Russians in the Channel

DR DAVID MORGAN-OWEN

The Battle of Trafalgar holds a special place in British history. The victory of 21st October 1805 is wound into the fabric of the nation: visitors to central London cannot help but awe at Nelson’s column and the surrounding square built in honour of his greatest achievement.

The importance of the Battle and the manner of the victory also holds a special place in the minds of British naval officers, for whom Trafalgar Day remains a source of pride and a connection with their service’s glorious past. This was true as much a century ago as it is today, particularly for one of the titans of the Edwardian Navy: Admiral Sir John Fisher.

Familiar to history for his ‘ruthless, relentless, remorseless’ reform of the Royal Navy and his championing of new weapons such as the submarine and HMS Dreadnought, Fisher was also acutely aware of the tradition in which he followed. He was fond of reminding friends and colleagues that he had been nominated as a candidate for entry to the Navy by Admiral Sir William Parker – the last officer to have been a captain under Nelson himself. This sense of history led Fisher to ensure that, when he learned that he would assume the office of First Sea Lord in the autumn of 1904, the date of his appointment was made for October 21st. Fisher relished this connection with the past, writing to supporters in anticipation of ‘our opening day on Trafalgar day’.

It is often remarked that Fisher was not a fighting Admiral – he last saw combat in 1882 during the siege of Alexandria and, despite a string of fleet commands, never led a force into battle. Yet his administration of the Admiralty began with an incident that very nearly pitched the Navy and the country into war, and one which will witness an uncomfortable parallel this week.

The year 1904 was one of rapid change in the international scene. After decades of tensions, Britain and France has signed the Entente Cordiale in April, bringing to a close twenty years of animosity and suspicion between the two in the colonial sphere. This rapprochement was threatened from the outset, however, by a war between Britain and France’s respective allies in Asia: Japan and Russia. The two Asian powers had been embroiled in a conflict for regional supremacy since February 1904, during which time London and Paris had worked hard to avoid being drawn in to the fighting in honour of their alliance commitments (to Tokyo and St. Petersburg respectively). This uneasy state of affairs was put to the test the day after Fisher arrived at the Admiralty, when Russian attempts to reinforce their faltering Pacific Fleet precipitated a crisis in the North Sea.

The Russians had faired poorly in the Far East during the course of 1904. The Japanese had caught the Tsar’s Pacific Fleet at anchor at Port Arthur and disabled several capital ships with a surprise torpedo attack in February, whereafter the Russian’s had struggled to regain the initiative against a modern, effective adversary. In an effort to redress the balance, Tsar Nicholas II dispatched his Baltic Fleet on the long journey to reinforce the beleagured Russian squadron in the east. British naval intelligence had long been sceptical as to the Russian Fleet’s efficiency, discipline, and fighting capacity, but the passage of the squadron through British waters remained a source of diplomatic tension. Relations between Britain and Russia had been strained for over a decade as the Tsar’s forces agitated along the North-West Frontier of India and the government was in no mind to aid the Russian passage. The British Fleet was thus on high alert as the Russian’s made their journey south towards the Channel.

The detail of what followed remains unclear, but it appears that the jittery Russian crews mistook a crowd of British fishing vessels off the Dogger Bank for a swarm of hostile torpedo boats and, fearful of the fate which had befallen their comrades in the Pacific, opened fire. The result was chaos. Russian ships fired upon each other, reported phantom torpedo hits, and let loose hundreds of shells at the unsuspecting fishermen. That none of the fishing vessels were sunk bore testament to the accuracy of naval intelligence’s appreciation of the Russian’s fighting capabilities, but at a time of great international uncertainty the affair very nearly escalated into a major crisis. The British Prime Minister, Arthur Baflour, was incandescent and initially inclined to unleash the might of the combined British Fleets upon the unsuspecting Russians. Admiral Fisher reported to his wife that ‘it has very nearly been war again. Very near indeed…’ The Russians obdurately refused to accept responsibility, Balfour’s brother lamenting ‘their inveterate habit of trying to take back in detail what they have conceded in the gross’. This intransigence obliged the British, who were unwilling start a war over the episode, to concede to international arbitration over the issue. In the meantime, the government closed the Suez Canal to the Russian ships, forcing them to take the Cape route to Port Arthur. The delay only postponed their fate: the Russian fleet suffered a decisive defeat at the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905. The Japanese victory was so complete that the Admiralty larconically described it as ‘equivalent to Trafalgar.’

A little over two centuries since Nelson triumphed over the Franco-Spanish Fleet and some 112 years after Britain and Russia almost went to war over the Dogger Bank incident, Russian warships will again visit British waters this week. The venerable Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and a number of escorts departed from Severomorsk and ports in the Baltic late last week, bound for the eastern Mediterranean. The Royal Navy and its NATO partners are preparing to escort the Russian armada on its highly provocative passage through the English Channel, which may indeed occur on the anniversary of Trafalgar itself.

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HMS Dragon with Russian Aircraft Carrier ‘Admiral Kuzetsov’ in 2014 via flickr.

The US are also keeping a close eye on the Russian flagship, not least due to the risk of her long-running history of mechanical problems resulting in her needing assistance during her voyage. Fishermen in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank may also be advised to keep a weather eye on the Russian ships, if history is any guide.

The Kuznetsov will add relatively little to Russian military capability in the eastern Mediterranean. Experts on Russian military affairs highlight the chronic shortage of pilots trained to operate from her and point out that her lack of catapult launchers will preclude planes taking off with a full payload of weapons. A tacit acknowledgement of her ongoing shortcomings is the fact that she will undergo a full refit upon return from the deployment in 2017.

Nevertheless, her deployment reminds us that, as Hew Strachan commented, ‘geography provides strategy with an underlying continuity.’ Britain’s position off the north-west coast of Europe means places her, as it has done for centuries, astride the key lines of maritime communication between Europe and the rest of the world. Just as she acted as a ‘breakwater’ obstructing German ambitions to world power in Admiral Fisher’s era, geography and capability make her the European country best placed to patrol NATO’s maritime flank in the event of Russian hostility. Her will to accept this role is less clear. With the arrival of the new aircraft carriers drawing closer these are exciting times for the Royal Navy, but the government has still yet to answer the vexed question of how many escorts will accompany them. Without the necessary support, the carriers may indeed become ‘exquisite capabilities’ or worse, critical vulnerabilities for an over-stretched Fleet.

The Russian’s will demonstrate the symbolic value of a carrier when they pass through the Straits of Dover this week. Nelson, Fisher, and today’s Royal Navy will be hoping that the Queen Elizabeths will afford Britain both prestige and military power.

Image: Lord Nelson atop Nelson’s Column in Trafalgar Square via wikimedia commons.

 

European Strategic Autonomy after the Brexit

PROF SVEN BISCOP

Prof. Biscop is the Director of the Europe in the World Programme at the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels, and a Professor at Ghent University. He is an Honorary Fellow of the European Security and Defence College.

The EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) is one of the most ambitious EU documents on defence to date. Presented to the Heads of State and Government by High Representative Federica Mogherini in June 2016, the EUGS is the first document to put forward the objective of strategic autonomy. Not a moment too soon, as security challenges inside and around Europe are rising, while the US has made it clear that it will not, and cannot, solve all of Europe’s problems.

The operational dimension of strategic autonomy comes down to the ability to act without the US whenever necessary. From that follows the industrial dimension: having a defence industry that can produce everything that this requires, notably the strategic enablers.

The EUGS sets out four major military tasks: to help protect the European way of life at home; to maintain stability in the broad neighbourhood; to maintain the freedom of the global commons; and to contribute to United Nations collective security. Together, these four tasks represent a clear increase in the burden placed on Europe’s armed forces.

The neighbourhood especially presents a challenge. The emphasis is on increasing resilience and building capacity, but where war is ongoing, the EUGS also commits the EU to protect civilians and to consolidate local ceasefires. That entails deploying troops on the ground with serious firepower, backed up by air support and ready reserves, who will not necessarily seek out and destroy an opponent but who will fight when the civilians for whom they are responsible are threatened. Without that determination, the EU will not have created a safe zone but a trap. For many Member States, land operations with such a high potential of combat go far beyond anything that they have recently undertaken, certainly in an autonomous European framework.

It is vital therefore that the implications of this and the other tasks are spelled out and fully taken on board by the political and military leadership. The EUGS provides for a “sectoral strategy” on defence to do exactly that, under the heading, recently announced by the High Representative, of an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. What this really is, of course, is an EU defence white paper.

The EUGS itself calls for “full-spectrum land, air, space and maritime capabilities, including strategic enablers”. The white paper must now quantify the four military tasks and the desired concurrency: How many operations, of which size, should Europeans be able to undertake simultaneously, without relying on non-European assets?

When a new strategy demands strategic autonomy, it would be contradictory to set too modest a level of ambition. Some now propose to focus on the autonomous deployment of a brigade, presenting this as an increase as compared to the ambition to have two battalion-size Battlegroups on stand-by. That, of course, is the wrong point of departure: the existing EU level of ambition is the Headline Goal – to deploy and sustain up to a corps of 60,000. It is the Headline Goal that must be revised – upwards.

For sure, if after a Brexit the British contribution is withdrawn from the EU’s Force Catalogue, it will create gaps that in the short term cannot be easily filled by the existing capabilities of the remaining Member States. But the Headline Goal was set in 1999, for a Union of 15 Member States. A revised Headline Goal will be a target for a Union of 27, with 1.35 million troops and a total defence expenditure of $200 billion. At the very least, the current Headline Goal should remain eminently feasible.

But with such overall numbers even an increased Headline Goal can be achieved over time – on the condition that defence integration is pushed much further. And an increased Headline Goal will be necessary if Europeans want to be able to deploy, simultaneously: long-term brigade-size stabilisation operations and a high intensity crisis management operation of several brigades and squadrons in the neighbourhood, as well as long-term naval operations, and battalion-size contributions to UN peacekeeping, while engaging in capacity-building and military cooperation.

In light of the crises in Europe’s neighbourhood and the global geopolitical tensions, this level of ambition is none too high. It is but the reflection of the rhythm of operations of the last decade. Maintaining and, over time, even increasing the Headline Goal is the realist option therefore: in view of what is necessary, but also in view of what is possible, looking at Europe’s military potential. Realism not only means not setting unachievable objectives – it also means not setting the bar too low and underexploit the potential that is there.

Furthermore, after the Brexit, Britain will still be in Europe, and British forces will still be there. If a crisis on Europe’s doorstep demands intervention, Britain is more likely than not to be a part of it. Even though UK will no longer be involved in defence cooperation under the EU flag, in practice EU strategic autonomy, at 27, can therefore still be pursued in the context of European strategic autonomy, at 28, assuming a British contribution on an ad hoc basis.

Mogherini has planned for the white paper to be adopted before the end of the year. Subsequently, the detailed catalogues of capability requirements, existing capabilities (minus the UK), and shortfalls will have to be updated. This will take time, but immediately after the adoption of the white paper, the European Defence Agency (EDA) can already update the Capability Development Plan (CDP), which was foreseen in 2017 anyway, and generate a first set of capability priorities in order to steer national and multinational efforts.

These priorities can then be incorporated into the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) as well. Only if the next iteration of the NDPP takes into account the capability requirements of European strategic autonomy, notably with regard to enablers, can a capability mix be created that allows EU Member States to do all: to contribute to Article 5, to undertake non-Article 5 operations with the US and the other non-EU Allies, and to launch autonomous expeditionary operations alone.

The white paper is key to the industrial side of strategic autonomy too. Under the next framework programme for research (2021-2027), the European Commission will, for the first time, provide significant funding (of at least €500 million) for defence research. The white paper and the resulting capability priorities must become the formal guidance for the use of these new funds. Industry must serve the Member States and their armed forces, not the other way around.

Finally, Member States need not wait to take action. The only way to achieve the capability targets will be further cooperation and integration, at two levels. At the EU-level, making full use of the EDA and Commission funds, to acquire the necessary strategic enablers. And at the level of various clusters of Member States, to create larger deployable formations through a combination of far-reaching pooling and specialization. The EU as such can facilitate cooperation in clusters, but only the Member States themselves can initiate it. They should do so as soon as the EU white paper is finished

At that point, two simultaneous processes should thus take off: while the EU institutions prepare a new iteration of the CDP, one or more clusters of Member States coming it at it from the other side should immediately announce the start of closer military integration between them, in order to demonstrate a number of shorter term results. For results is what we need.

For a detailed analysis, see http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/egmont-papers-87_v1final.pdf.

Image: HRVP Mogherini presents EU Global Strategy to NATO Sec General Stoltenberg, June, 2016, via flickr.

NATO’s Warsaw Summit and Russia: deterrence or provocation?

DR TRACEY GERMAN

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Summit in Warsaw, which took place 8-9 July 2016, focused on the continuing threat to Euro-Atlantic security from Russia, leading to an emphasis on deterrence and a strengthening of the alliance’s defence posture, moving away from its previous posture of reassurance. The summit’s final communiqué was uncompromising in its description of Russia’s ‘aggressive actions’ including the ‘ongoing illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea’, ‘the violation of sovereign borders by force’, ‘the deliberate destabilisation of eastern Ukraine’, ‘provocative military activities near NATO’s borders’ and ‘irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric’. The alliance’s response, as outlined in the communiqué, is to augment its deterrence and defence posture, establishing an enhanced forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. This will comprise four battalion-sized battlegroups with forces provided by the framework nations of Canada, Germany, the UK and the US (along with other contributing allies) that can operate in concert with national forces and will be present at all times in the four countries. The alliance also declared its intention of developing a forward presence in the Black Sea region. Details of this plan were sketchy, although the communiqué stressed that, in addition to the Romanian-led initiative to establish a multinational framework brigade, NATO will consider strengthening both its air and maritime presence in the region.

Russia considers these increasing military deployments along its borders as a threat to its national security. Whilst NATO sought to underline that it does not seek confrontation with Russia nor poses a threat to it, this is not the message that has been received in Moscow, which has increased its (already high) level of anti-Western rhetoric. Speaking on the state-owned Rossiya-1 TV channel, Dmitry Kiseylov, the presenter of a weekly news review programme, said that the summit made it clear that Russia was no longer a partner, but a target and that NATO was preparing for war. This tone was echoed across a range of media and official statements. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused NATO of existing in a fantasy world and demonising Russia in order to divert attention away from the alliance’s ‘destructive’ role, while an article in the Kommersant newspaper argued that the guiding principle of the summit was ‘if you want peace, prepare for war.’

The Russian response to the summit outcomes comes as no surprise: continued opposition to NATO’s global reach and enlargement has been a long-running theme in Russian rhetoric. The Russian political narrative remains dominated by anti-Western sentiment, as well as talk of ‘competition’ and the need to be ‘competitive’ with the West, which is thought to be encroaching into an area that had previously been Moscow’s exclusive zone of influence. This reflects a strong (and widespread) sense of grievance at perceived Western hostility, inflexibility and unwillingness to cooperate with Moscow. There is anger at what is seen as the West’s rejection of partnership with Russia, as well as its destabilisation of the international system – but little recognition that this is how the West views Russian behaviour over the past few years. Russia’s permanent envoy to NATO, Alexander Grushko argued in a recent interview that NATO is seeking to impose new dividing lines on Europe and that Russia is not ‘remotely interested in the confrontational agenda … being offered’. Nevertheless, he warned that Russia will do everything to ensure its defence and that NATO’s eastwards expansion will be counterproductive, as it subjects Russia to ‘risks and threats’.

NATO used the summit communiqué to stress the need for continued dialogue with Russia within the framework of the revived NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which met at ambassadorial level on July 13, days after the summit had concluded. The meeting, which was only the second time the NRC had met since 2014, did little to reduce tensions between the two actors. Speaking afterwards, Grushko described NATO’s decision to deploy an additional four battalions in the Baltic States and Poland as ‘ungrounded, excessive, counter-productive and confrontational’, warning that it would ‘return us to the days of the Cold War’. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made it clear that there had not been a meeting of minds, but welcomed the opportunity to ‘clarify our positions to each other’, along with Russian support for a Finnish proposal on air safety measures in the Baltic Sea region.

The lack of genuine, constructive dialogue between the two parties is a serious cause for concern. Both Russia and NATO have positioned each other as adversaries, portraying the other as a significant threat to security and stability, and each believes that it is acting defensively in the face of a growing challenge from the other. Neither wants a war, but, in the current climate of mutual mistrust and continued confrontation, there is a danger that deterrence measures are perceived as an escalation of violence, prompting further counter-measures. In a time of widespread instability, more needs to be done to diffuse existing tensions and stimulate constructive dialogue, rather than the rhetoric of threat: Russia’s cooperation in tackling the menace from IS and international terrorism, as well as stabilising the Middle East and North Africa, is vital.

 

Image: Russia-NATO permanent mission logo. Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

THE OTHER VIETNAM ANALOGY: TONY BLAIR, HAROLD WILSON AND THE ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’.

DR GERAINT HUGHES

Even before the release of the Chilcot Report on 6th July 2016 the reputation of Tony Blair was tarnished by the controversies surrounding Britain’s involvement in the Iraq War (2003-2009), his relationship with former President George W. Bush, and the flawed decision-making which took the UK into this conflict. One side-effect of Operation Telic is that it has contributed to the retrospective rehabilitation of another former Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, with particular reference to his reaction to the Vietnam War. Wilson is now praised for refusing to send British forces to fight in this conflict, and he has been held up as an example that Blair should have followed.

The comparisons between both conflicts and the leaders concerned are superficially attractive. Both involved Labour Prime Ministers who entered office comparatively young (in their late forties), on the back of electoral disaffection with a tired and discredited Conservative government, and both presented themselves as technocrats who were also down with the kids – Wilson gave the Beatles MBEs, Blair invited Noel Gallagher to No.10. Both faced a dilemma when a Texan President asked them to commit British troops to fight as part of a US-led alliance in a foreign conflict, and had to balance the strategic requirement to uphold the ‘special relationship’ with the political consequences of participating in a war condemned as illegitimate and unjust by a swathe of international opinion, not to mention the ranks of the Labour Party and a vocal anti-war movement.

At face value, Wilson made a significant – and, in the view of his latter-day defenders, brave – decision to refuse Lyndon Johnson’s requests for military support. The reality of the historical record is more complex.

Wilson was originally from the left of Labour, although by the time he became Prime Minister in October 1964 he had moved to the centre, and also selected a Shadow Cabinet from the ‘Atlanticist’ right of the party. During his first premiership (October 1964-June 1970) his two Chancellors (James Callaghan and Roy Jenkins), three Foreign Secretaries (Patrick Gordon-Walker, Michael Stewart and George Brown) and Defence Secretary (Denis Healey) were right-wingers who were firmly – if not uncritically – pro-American. Nonetheless Wilson preserved his links with the Labour left via Cabinet colleagues like Richard Crossman and Barbara Castle, and he was conscious that Vietnam was in issue which could fracture party unity. This became an increasingly greater problem as the war continued, and as the core of hard-left MPs were reinforced by more centrist colleagues who were appalled by the humanitarian suffering caused by the conflict, and feared that US escalation could provoke a disastrous war with China, and possibly the USSR too.

The Prime Minister was in a bind. The USA was not only Britain’s most important alliance partner, but was also providing financial assistance to prevent the devaluation of the pound. However, Wilson feared escalation, and also fretted over the fact that the conflict between the USA and North Vietnam undermined his efforts to promote improved Anglo-Soviet relations. Wilson did also share the humanitarian concerns of many Labour MPs over the war’s death toll, and had a genuine (if inflated) conviction that it was his role to play peacemaker. As a result, the Labour leader presented the Johnson administration with the following compromise.

Unlike Australia or New Zealand, Britain would not commit a contingent to fight in South Vietnam; officially because the UK was overstretched in the low-level war (or ‘confrontation’) with Indonesia over Borneo, and also because as co-chair of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina it was obliged to promote a negotiated solution to the war in Vietnam. But unlike the French President Charles de Gaulle Wilson resisted appeals from Labour backbenchers to condemn US policy in Indochina, offering diplomatic backing for the American war effort, repeatedly declaring that Washington DC was fully justified in supporting the Saigon regime. In essence, British policy on Vietnam was to prove Johnson with all support short of troops.

The Chilcot hearings and the report show that in the run-up to the Iraq war of 2003 there was vociferous support – not just in Cabinet but also within the Chiefs of Staff (COS) and also the intelligence services – for a British contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom. In contrast, Wilson’s compromise over Vietnam was essentially unchallenged in Whitehall. Although Cabinet colleagues like Stewart were prepared to publicly defend US policy, Cabinet Ministers, the Foreign Office, the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Ministry of Defence and the COS alike were  collectively unwilling to commit British soldiers to a fight with the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese Army. The British armed forces were after all already overstretched by their NATO commitments, and also the ‘confrontation’ in Borneo (1962-1966) and the fruitless counter-insurgency campaign in Aden and South Arabia (1962-1967).

So even if Cabinet colleagues (notably the ever resentful and occasionally well-lubricated Brown) and Foreign Office diplomats were critical of Wilson’s posturing over peace proposals, the policy of non-involvement was never contested. The UK did find discreet means of assisting the US war effort – soldiers from the British Special Air Service on secondment with their Australian and New Zealand counterparts apparently did see combat in South Vietnam – but the idea of even a token overt commitment to the conflict (the ‘platoon of Highlanders with bagpipes’, as LBJ put it) was never seriously mooted in Whitehall.

Wilson hoped that his compromise would satisfy LBJ and the Labour left. It did neither. Johnson and his officials were privately contemptuous of the British Prime Minister, and regarded his repeated engagement with peace initiatives with ill-concealed scorn. Responding to one request for a summit meeting, LBJ replied (with typical profanity) ‘[we] have got enough pollution around here already without Harold coming over with his fly open and his pecker hanging out, peeing all over me’. Meanwhile, Wilson himself faced a barrage of invective and fury from anti-war activists, backbench MPs and press critics which was as vitriolic as that which Blair received forty years later. In April 1965 the satirical journal Private Eye printed a front page cartoon by Gerald Scarfe showing Wilson applying his tongue to Johnson’s rear – an image which makes the more recent renditions of Blair as Bush’s lapdog look tame.  Wilson also faced public displays of hostility which at times descended into violence. After one visit to Cambridge in October 1967 the Prime Minister was mobbed in his car by protesters who called him a ‘right-wing bastard’ and a ‘Vietnam murderer’, and he had to be rescued by police.

Wilson received little if any contemporary praise for keeping British boys out of the Mekong Delta or the Central Highlands, or for trying to get the US and North Vietnamese to the conference table. Domestic opponents of the war saw him as a hypocrite who facilitated American imperialism and war crimes against a small and weak South-East Asian country. The US President and his inner circle for their part despised him, regarding him as a faithless ally who had failed to come to their aid. This sentiment was expressed by the habitually Anglophile Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, during the last months of Johnson’s presidency, when he shouted at one Times journalist ‘[when] the Russians invade Sussex, don’t expect us to come and help you!’

After Chilcot, and with the memory of 179 servicemen and women killed in Iraq, it is difficult to see how Blair could get the same revisionist reappraisal that Wilson received after his death. Nonetheless, any historian who has studied the Prime Minister depicted as the ‘Yorkshire Walter Mitty’ will find it ironic that Wilson is being presented as the model that Blair should have followed with respect to Anglo-American relations and the Iraq war. For in the eyes of his contemporary critics, Wilson was as discredited and as compromised over Vietnam as ‘Bush’s poodle’ is now.

Images: Harold Wilson at a meeting with US Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara  and  Tony Blair at the 50th Munich Security Conference, 31st January 2014; photograph taken by Marc Müller, both via wikimedia commons.

Brexit and International Security: A Guide for Undecided Voters

DR BEN KIENZLE

The most recent polls for the referendum on Britain leaving the European Union suggest that neither the ‘Brexit’ nor the ‘Bremain’ camps have mustered the necessary support to win today. The still undecided voters will certainly play a crucial role. So, how should these voters take their decision? The most obvious approach is to gather as much impartial information as possible. Admittedly, in the present climate of the referendum campaign identifying such information is a challenging task. However, I argue in this blog post that academic scholarship can offer useful remedies. To be sure, academics have been accused of a clear Bremain bias. After all, a substantial number of academics have come out in favour of Britain staying in the EU. Universities UK, the umbrella organization for British universities, supports strongly the Bremain campaign and, according to The Independent, ‘vice chancellors from almost every major higher education institution in Britain say they are “gravely concerned” about a vote to leave’. At a recent workshop on the security implications of a potential Brexit, which I co-organized at King’s College London, it was difficult to find pro-Brexit security experts. None the less, academic scholars have demonstrated that they are capable of providing much needed, impartial information, as Anand Menon of the UK in a Changing Europe initiative has argued forcefully in a recent article for The Guardian. In a recent contribution to this blog, I have already refuted the arguments by both Brexit and Bremain supporters who have tried to use defence-related arguments in their campaigns.

In this contribution, I will go beyond the narrow focus on military defence. Using basic insights from International Relations theory, I will offer an impartial examination of British membership in the EU in the context of international security. From an International Relations perspective, the EU is basically a very advanced form of inter-state cooperation. And the classical International Relations theories tell us that states cooperate because it is in their national interest to do so. Historically, the main examples of international cooperation are alliances. You do not have to be a military genius to realize that it was easier to defeat Nazi Germany or to oppose the Soviet Union as a block of states rather than each country for itself. However, International Relations scholars also tell us that effective international cooperation always comes with a price tag. Especially for major players like the UK it is very difficult to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others. This is, if you will, the fundamental issue of this referendum: whereas the Brexit supporters believe that the price tag of EU cooperation is too hefty, Bremain supporters argue that the benefits of EU membership outweigh its costs.

But what do International Relations scholars consider to be ‘costs’? Too much focus in this regard has been on the misleading figures of the UK’s financial contributions to the EU. More important are costs in terms of national independence. In abstract terms, cooperation always entails some sort of compromise. In other words, if a nation state cooperates with other nation states its narrow national interests will be ‘compromised’ in one way or another. Let’s take an easy example: NATO and its leadership. The Alliance members have accepted that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe is always a US commander. This might be a small price to pay for America’s continuing commitment to NATO, but it is still a significant concession in terms of national military independence. Consequently, (neo) realist scholars believe that strong international cooperation only occurs – and should occur –in the rare instances when (minor) limits on national independence offer far superior benefits in terms of national interests. As the new head of the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, Prof. Michael Rainsborough, argued in The Telegraph, ‘What remains permanent in Europe and the world are nation states that ultimately have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests.’

There is no doubt that the EU encroaches on the UK’s national independence – every international organization of which the UK is a member does so in one way or another. In economic terms this encroachment is arguably more obvious than in the case international security. After all, in the realm of international security, the EU remains a largely intergovernmental organization, where decisions are still taken by consensus. Most notably, the EU does not infringe the right of the UK – or any other member state for that matter – to take fundamental national security decisions on their own, e.g. the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003 or the decision about the renewal of Trident. However, research shows that it is also true that many security-relevant decisions in Europe are not taken anymore in the national capitals in isolation, but rather by national representatives in Brussels. Conceptually, this is called supranational intergovernmentalism. Another example where the UK has lost some of its security-relevant national independence is border control. Although Britain has never joined the Schengen Agreement and remains formally in control of its borders – hence the long queues at the border control posts at UK airports whenever we try to enter the country! – the border-free Schengen zone and the free movement of persons in the EU has certainly limited the UK’s ability to control its borders.

However, all these costs in terms of national independence also have clear benefits for the UK. First, EU membership reduces uncertainty. Although the EU might have its shortcomings, at least we know what we have. And this might be better for the UK’s national interests than going it alone in an increasingly turbulent world. As the saying goes, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. To be clear, nobody knows what will happen if the UK actually leaves the EU. There is certainly the possibility that the UK will be better off after the Brexit. But there is also a high risk that the UK will be worse off. As the historian Lawrence Freedman pointed out in a recent article for Survival, ‘Extracting the United Kingdom from the European Union is not going to make either body stronger or better able to cope with the current set of security challenges, whether from Russia or ISIS. It could leave both in a much weaker position. With so little clarity on what Brexit is intended to achieve, it is hard to think of a greater test of the law of unintended consequences’.

Second, international organizations such as the EU help to lower transaction costs, as (neo) liberal scholars have argued since the 1980s. What this means in practice will be all too familiar to those readers with small children. As the eminent International Relations scholar Stephen Walt explained in a blog post for Foreign Policy, ‘My kids might like to negotiate every single aspect of their lives, but who has time? And as with most norms, failures in the short-term are less important than success in the long run’. In other words, cooperation with like-minded countries in an institutionalized setting like the EU tends to be much more efficient in the long-term than negotiating new forms of cooperation from scratch, whenever the need for working with other nations arises.

Third, many of today’s major security issues are global in nature. Transnational crime, the proliferation of WMD, climate change, energy security or the rise of China are issues that affect in one way or another most nation states, including the UK. Likewise, the issues cannot be addressed effectively by individual nation states, even the most powerful ones. For instance, if the UK tackles climate change nationally, but China and other major actors continue with their greenhouse gas emissions, British policies will not have a major impact and the UK is still likely to face the consequences of climate change. In International Relations theory, these kind of challenges are known as collective action problems. And the only way to avoid these kind of problems are powerful international organizations such as the EU.

So, what does all this theorizing about security cooperation tell the undecided voters today? Clearly, they should not cast their vote based on an ill-defined gut-feeling but on a fundamental decision about what each individual voter values most: national independence, though without being able to reap fully the benefits of security cooperation with the EU and its member states; or the ability to shape collective responses to common problems, but with less national independence. The ideal solution – full sovereignty and full benefits from cooperation – is unfortunately simply a pipe dream. As all too often in life, we can’t have the cake and eat it too.

Image via pixabay.

NATO and the challenges of implementing effective deterrence vis-à-vis Russia

PROFESSOR WYN BOWEN

In the run up to the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the British and Polish Embassies in Copenhagen, hosted by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, organised a one-day conference on ‘Transforming NATO in an Unpredictable Security Environment’. At the event in March I gave a talk on a topic related to one of my current research areas, specifically on the challenges to NATO of effectively delivering deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. This piece briefly summarises the thrust of the talk and some of the emerging themes of the research.

 

Clearly there are many challenges that confront NATO in the context of developing and implementing effective deterrence vis-à-vis Russia going forward. Six are singled out here.

  1. Understanding Russian strategy including what comes, or may come, next
  2. Political asymmetry and deterrence credibility
  3. Deterrence in the broader picture
  4. Non-military means of deterrence
  5. Nuclear stability including missile defence
  6. Relearning deterrence across the Alliance

 

  1. Understanding Russian strategy and what comes, or may come, next

Russia is the principal challenger to the status quo in Europe and is the one actor that could, currently, pose an existential threat to NATO states because of its significant and diverse nuclear assets. This places an imperative on the understanding Russia piece, which is central to the Alliance establishing what NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has described as ‘modern deterrence’.

To effectively deter requires getting inside the head of any actor that is the target of deterrence, in any given context. It requires what Matt Waldman refers to as ‘strategic empathy’ – to understand and to take into account the position and perspective of the challenger. This is important not only for figuring out what might deter, but also for forecasting the types of scenarios within which deterrence may be called upon to play a role. But such forecasting is clearly challenging – Russian action in Crimea and Syria took the west by surprise. But in retrospect — and things are always more straightforward looking backwards of course — Russian actions in both contexts are explainable when situated within President Putin’s domestic and international narrative, and an assessment of Russia’s traditional strategic interests.

Given President Putin’s penchant for strategic surprise, it is indeed difficult to forecast what may come next. Wisely and understandably, NATO is now very much focused on the Baltics and the challenge Moscow may pose to Alliance members bordering Russia. But there may be other scenarios that NATO needs to think about. This necessitates understanding what drives modern Russia, and President Putin in particular, and therefore understanding the underlying political and economic interests of both the Russian Federation and the current government. It means seeking to develop insights from an analysis of these interests — and how Russia and the Putin government have acted previously to secure them – in order to forecast Russian motives and intentions going forward. The domestic realm is of upmost importance here, particularly the role of domestic politics in determining the current government’s external behaviour. Is it all about Putin staying in power? How important is the narrative of national humiliation and of Russian encirclement by the west? Addressing these and related questions clearly need to inform assessments of the possible scenarios that NATO will confront in the future.

  1. Political asymmetry and deterrence credibility

A second challenge involves the political asymmetry between NATO and Russia, notably in terms of unity of effort. Under President Putin, Moscow has in recent years been able to coordinate all levers of national power and influence in pursuit of its goals, be it consolidating Russia’s interests and influence in the Middle East through its Syrian deployment, or annexing Crimea and destabilising Ukraine. Actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine have demonstrated Russia’s effective co-ordination of diplomatic, information and economic levers of power in tandem with irregular and conventional military forces, and nuclear sabre rattling in the background. When wrapped in a cloak of ambiguity — as in Crimea and eastern Ukraine — this coordinated approach can be difficult to counter for those on the receiving end of Russian coercive actions, primarily because of the plausible deniability it is designed to offer Moscow. Deterring a challenger that seeks to maintain such ambiguity is not a straightforward task and NATO is confronting this challenge right now.

The Russia example stands in comparison to NATO, which as an Alliance of 28 member states must do everything by consensus. Indeed, there exist many and varied views within NATO on the nature of the challenge posed by Russia, as well as on how its belligerence and growing assertiveness should be countered. On this latter point, the core question of how to deter Russian adventurism against the Alliance itself has elicited different views – for example, between Poland and the Baltic states on one hand, and states further to the west on the other, regarding how best to militarily bolster the eastern part of the Alliance in order to deter any future Russian moves against NATO. While Poland and the Baltics favour a more substantial forward presence to bolster deterrence this view is not shared across the alliance, far from it. This issue is clearly to the fore ahead of the Warsaw Summit and it poses the question of to what extent such internal debate weakens the Alliance’s credibility by demonstrating divergences over how to deter and, therefore, potentially over the resolve of all members to directly counter any future Russian aggression whatever form it takes.

In short, the challenge here involves a 28 member, consensus based organisation with multiple perspectives and interests seeking to deter a unified challenger with a grand strategic approach to using and coordinating all its levers of power in a coherent and effective way.

  1. Deterrence in the broader picture

A third challenge is working out how deterrence fits within a broader approach for dealing with Russia and its potential for adventurism against NATO. Deterrence is rarely the only strand in approaching strategic challenges and it must be considered alongside dialogue and diplomacy as a means to address the challenge posed by Russia. Reassurance is also important of course, specifically establishing what type of reassurance might be relevant to President Putin – what could be communicated to Moscow in terms of what the Alliance will not do if deterrence remains intact? Alongside what the Alliance will not tolerate and will directly respond to?

  1. Non-military means of deterrence

Deterrence is not just a military endeavour of course. Other levers of power and influence can play a role. At one level there is the obvious question related to how the nuclear and conventional military elements should relate to one another. Economic pressure — through sanctions — is also important in terms of building a comprehensive approach to deterring bad behaviour, with NATO’s relationship with the EU clearly very important. Resilience in those Alliance states bordering Russia is another area where deterrence by denial can be bolstered. For example, Lanoszka (2016) makes an important argument about developing civil society in member states on the borders of Russia to counteract subversive Russian activities, as well as law enforcement and intelligence capabilities to detect and counteract any such behaviour. The challenge of course is to establish how these different elements operate in combination to achieve the overall desired effect of preventing a Russian challenge to NATO integrity and credibility.

  1.  Nuclear stability including missile defence

The growing risk of confrontation between Russia and NATO brings with it an increased risk of nuclear use of course. In addition to Moscow’s nuclear sabre rattling of recent years, Russia has placed a greater emphasis on sub-strategic nuclear forces and its strategic doctrine now provides for possible employment of pre-emptive or preventive, as well as de-escalatory, nuclear strikes. Coupled with known current or future Russian capability developments — nuclear modernization, a new aerospace defence system, violations of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and deployment of dual-capable missiles to Kaliningrad or Crimea – a key challenge for strategic planners in NATO is how to preserve nuclear stability within this rapidly evolving context. Moreover, while missile defence is unlikely to feature prominently on the agenda of the Warsaw Summit, the next administration in Washington is due to review US nuclear and missile defence posture within its first 12 months, and this is likely to be followed by a review of NATO’s approach to missile defence. The 2010 US Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated that the US and Russia are “no longer enemies” and there is “no significant prospect of war between them”. Given the fundamental changes that have occurred in the US and the Alliance’s relationship with Russia since 2010, this is yet another issue that requires serious thought related to the maintenance of strategic stability going forward (Ivanka Barzashka and I are currently working on a project funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York examining missile defence and nuclear stability).

  1. Relearning deterrence across the Alliance

A sixth challenge involves relearning deterrence. NATO is being forced to rapidly relearn how to deter after two and half decades of neglect. There is a human capital challenge here, of course, with many of those policy and military officials with direct experience of thinking about and practicing deterrence either retired or close to retiring. Another element of the challenge involves establishing the role for cross-domain deterrence vis-à-vis Russia, and demonstrating resolve without unnecessary and unintended escalation and provocation. On this latter point, however, it will be challenging for NATO to develop a credible deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia unless the Alliance is demonstrably ready and willing to escalate in the event of a Russian transgression against it.

 

Image: BALTIC SEA (April 12, 2016) A Russian Sukhoi Su-24 attack aircraft makes a low altitude pass by USS Donald Cook (DDG 75). Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.